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CORPORATE EXPENDITURES IN SUPPORT OF, OR 
AGAINST POLITICAL CANDIDATES: HAS THE 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE CHANGED AFTER THE BCRA 
AND CITIZENS UNITED? 
by 
Glen M. Vogel* 
"I think we are at a very critical time in 
this country. I can tell you beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that uh, the Hillary 
Clinton that I know is not equipped, not 
qualified to be our commander in chief "1 
The public's ability to discuss and debate the character 
and fitness of presidential candidates is at the core of the First 
Amendment's prohibition that, "Confess shall make no law .. 
. abridging the Freedom of Speech." Despite the existence of 
this fundamental right, articulated so eloquently in our 
founding document, in November 2002, Congress made 
political speech a felony for one class of speakers -
corporations and unions. 3 
*Glen M. Vogel , Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal 
Studies in the Hofstra University Zarb School of Business. He 
would like to acknowledge and thank the Zarb School of 
Business for its generous summer grant to support the research 
efforts associated with this article. Gratitude also is extended 
to Jonathan Vecchi , Paul Johnson, and Eleanor Sharkey for 
their valuable research contributions. 
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Under the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform 
Law ("McCain Feingold law"), corporations and unions faced 
monetary penalties and up to five years in prison for 
broadcasting candidate-related advocacy during federal 
elections. 4 
Outlawing political speech based on the identity of the 
speaker appears to collide with the fundamental principles set 
forth in the First Amendment. On January 10, 20 I 0, the United 
States Supreme Court addressed this collision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission. 5 
In one of the most controversial decisions in decades 
' the Supreme Court, in Citizens United, invalidated the portions 
of the McCain-Feingold law that dealt directly with corporate 
expenditures in support of political candidates. 6 This decision 
set off an eruption of political debate and fierce partisanship. 7 
Some legal scholars and journalists called the decision 
and claimed _the decision was made in "bad 
faith. Still others charactenzed Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion as "more like the ranting of a right-wing talk show host 
than the rational view of a justice with a sense of political 
realism."
9 
The New York Times, in several editorials, blasted 
the Court and called the decision "disastrous," 10 "terrible,"" 
d " kl "1 2 In &: h d 0 0 an rec ess. tact, t e ectsiOn sparked so much 
controversy that President Obama "called out" the Court and 
specifically referred to Citizens United during his State of the 
Union Address in January 2009. 13 According to President 
Obama, "the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I 
believe will open the floodgates for special interests -
including foreign corporations - to spend without limit in our 
elections. I don't think American elections should be 
bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by 
foreign entities .... " 14 
The Court's decision in Citizens United unleashed a 
torrential wave of criticism from the media along with raising 
31 Vol 27 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
new questions and concerns from corporations who were 
unsure about how this decision impacted the rules governing 
the area of corporate expenditures and it left many companies 
afraid to run afoul of the law since there are criminal penalties 
at stake. 15 Businesses are afraid to use their funds in support of 
candidates since they are unsure what, if anything, the Court 
invalidated and what restrictions remain in place when it comes 
to corporations expending their own funds in support of 
political parties and/or campaigns. 
In order to effectively analyze the impact of the Court's 
holding in this controversial 5-4 decision, this article will 
discuss the following: Part I will discuss the case law and 
regulatory history of campaign finance law in the United States 
over the past one-hundred years; Part II will look at the 
campaign finance law at issue in Citizens United (the McCain-
Feingold law) and some of its critical components; Part III will 
look at the background of the Citizens United case and the 
Court's holding along with some of its practical implications; 
Part IV will examine some lesser discussed aspects of the 
decision as well as the issues that have been misinterpreted by 
the media; and Part V will offer some conclusions. 
A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
Citizens United was not the first time that the issue of 
corporate involvement in federal campaigns was debated by 
16 0 d 0 litigants or addressed by Congress. CorporatiOns an umons 
have long faced limits on direct contributions to political 
campaigns. 17 The first restrictions on corporate involvement in 
the political process goes back more than a century 18 and was 
enacted to limit what sponsors considered to be the corporate 
corrupting influence on the political marketplace. 19 
2012 I Corporate Expenditures 14 
The start of the 20'h century, often identified as the 
gilded age20, is known as a period of enormous economic and 
industrial growth in America. The largest and most influential 
businesses at the time were railroads, banks, and steel 
companies owned by the super-rich industrialists and financiers 
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W. 
Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Flagler, and J.P. Morgan. 2 1 
All of these men were attacked as "robber barons" by critics, 
who believed they cheated to get their money and that, because 
of their wealth, they were able to gain tremendous influence 
over politicians, Congress, and even the Presidency. 22 
The concept of having Congress address the problem of 
corporate political influence all started with President 
Theodore Roosevelt's State of the Union address after the 1904 
election. 23 Roosevelt was outspoken in his opposition to 
corporate influence on politics and suggested an outright ban 
on all contributions by corporations to avoid even the 
appearance of corruption or influence. 24 Two years later, in 
1907, Congress passed the Tillman Act, which prohibited 
corporations from making any contributions for the purposes of 
influencing a federal election's outcome. 25 While banning 
political contributions to candidates, the Tillman Act was silent 
on the issue of corporations expending their funds on their own 
in support of or against a candidate. 26 An independent 
expenditure is money spent by a corporation or union in 
support of a candidate in a manner uncoordinated with any 
political party or the candidate himself. 27 
While direct contributions to candidates by corporations 
have been illegal since 1907, it was not until 1947 and the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress specifically 
prohibited independent expenditures made in support of a 
candidate by a corporation or labor union. 28 Immediately after 
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, President Harry S. 
51 Vol 27 I North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Truman questioned its constitutionality, particularly the 
independent contributions ban, when he vetoed the bill stating 
that it was a, "dangerous intrusion on free speech. " 29 The bill 
eventually passed despite the President's opposition, and it did 
not take long for the Supreme Court to comment on the validity 
of the statute's new restrictions on corporate expenditures. 30 In 
1948, in United States v. Cl031 , the Court did not specifically 
address the constitutionality of the independent expenditure 
ban; however, four justices in dissent remarked that they had 
"the gravest doubt" about the constitutionality of the 
prohibition. 32 Almost a decade later, in United States v. 
Automobile Workers, the Court would take a closer look at the 
constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley Act's corporate 
expenditure ban. 33 Here, even though the court held that the 
expenditure ban, as-applied to the specific facts of the case, 
appropriately prohibited a union television broadcast that 
specifically advocated for congressional candidates, the Court 
never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of the statute as 
a whole. 34 Again, in dissent, three justices argued that the 
Court should have addressed the constitutional question and, 
had it done so, they would have found the ban on independent 
expenditures unconstitutional. 35 Justice Douglas, in his dissent 
in the Automobile Workers case stated that: 
Some may think that one group or another 
should not express its views in an election 
because it is too powerful, because it advocates 
unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of 
lawless action. But these are not justifications 
for withholding First Amendment rights from 
any group - labor or corporate .... First 
Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all 
persons and groups in this country. They are 
not to be dispensed or withheld merely because 
we or the Congress thinks the person or group is 
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worthy or unworthy. 36 
Over the next two decades, the constitutionality of the ban on 
expenditures would get bantered about or commented upon in 
dicta, but it would never be fully addressed by the courts. 37 
After the Watergate scandal in the early 1970's, 
Congress took another look at the myriad of issues surrounding 
the federal campaign finance system and attempted to resolve 
those issues with the passage of several amendments to the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA "). 38 FECA, 
originally passed in 1971, along with its 1974 Amendments, is 
essentially the foundation upon which the most recent 
campaign finance laws were built. 39 FECA, among other 
things, established new contribution limits for individuals 
' political parties, and political action committees ("PACs") and 
established filing requirements for both contributions and 
expenditures. 40 While controversial41 , the 1974 Amendments 
to FECA were Congress 's attempt to restore the public's 
confidence in the integrity of the electoral system and to 
remedy the loopholes and problems that were identified after 
the Watergate scandal. 42 Essentially, FECA imposed three 
different restrictions on corporations ' and labor unions ' efforts 
to influence elections. 43 They imposed contribution limitations 
and banned independent expenditures44, they imposed 
fundraising restrictions, and they limited the contributions to 
political committees and PACs.45 They also imposed disclosure 
requirements on P ACs for contributions based on the amount 
contributed, the nature of the contributor, and the 
contribution's proximity to an election. 46 
Buckley v. Valeo 
Shortly after FECA was amended, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of the new statutory limitations 
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on campaign contributions and expenditures in Buckley v. 
Valeo.47 In Buckley, the Court was asked to address three 
major issues: the constitutionality of the limits on direct 
contributions to candidates, the constitutionality of the 
independent expenditure ban, and the constitutionality of the 
disclosure requirements. 48 When the Court examined the 
provision limiting the amount an individual may expend in 
support or defeat of a particular candidate, it held, " the 
governmental interest in preventing corruption and the 
appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify .. . [the 
statute's] ceiling on independent expenditures."49 The Court 
remarked, "the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment.. .. " 50 Based upon this First Amendment analysis, 
the Court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the 
limitation on independent expenditures was unconstitutional. 51 
The Court pointed out that, "the independent expenditure 
ceiling . .. fails to serve any substantial governmental interest 
in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the 
electoral process."52 Oddly, even though the Court invalidated 
the independent expenditure limitation provlSlon for 
individuals, it did not consider the constitutionality of the 
separate ban on corporate and umon independent 
d. 53 expen ttures. 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 
Less than two years after Buckley, the Court struck 
down a state-law prohibition on corporate independent 
expenditures related to referenda issues in the case of First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti . 54 In Bellotti, two national 
banking associations and three business corporations wanted to 
spend money to publicize their position on a proposed state 
constitutional amendment that would have permitted the 
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legislature to impose a graduated individual income tax. 55 The 
statute at issue prohibited the corporations from making 
contributions or expenditures "for the purpose of . . . 
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to 
th t ,s6 A . fi . e vo ers.. .. ny corporatiOn or corporate of Icer, director, 
or agent who violated the statute could be subject to a 
monetary fine and up to a year imprisonment. 57 The Supreme 
Court rejected the state statute's prohibition of corporate 
expenditures related to issue advocacy on the principle that the 
government does not have the power to ban corporations from 
speaking on political issues. 58 
"We thus find no support in the First 
Amendment . .. or in the decisions ofthis Court 
for the proposition that speech that otherwise ' 
would be within the protection of the First 
Amendment loses that protection simply because 
its source is a corporation . . .. " 59 
While the Bellotti decision did not address the constitutionality 
of the State's ban on corporate independent expenditures in 
support of individual candidates, the Supreme Court has 
offered that had the issue been analyzed, it would have 
invalidated the ban on the premise that the First Amendment 
does not permit restrictions on political speech merely because 
the speaker is a corporation. 60 
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
It was not until 1990, in Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce61 , that the Court finally addressed the 
issue of corporate independent expenditures head-on. In 
Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use its 
general treasury funds to run an advertisement in a local 
newspaper in support of a candidate who was attempting to fill 
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a vacancy in the Michigan House of Representatives. 62 Section 
54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited 
corporations from making contributions and independent 
expenditures in connection with state candidate elections. 
63 
Worse yet, any vi?lation of the_ prohibition on co
6
rporate 
independent expenditures was pumshable as a felony. The 
Chamber of Commerce initiated an action seeking injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the Act claiming the prohibition 
on corporate independent expenditures was unconstitutional 
and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
65 
While the Buckley and Bellotti cases were not 
controlling - because neither case directly addressed the 
constitutionality of prohibiting corporate independent 
expenditures in support of a candidate - the Austin Court 
circumvented the traditional First Amendment analysis utilized 
in those cases and identified a new governmental interest in 
limiting political speech: an anti-distortion interest. 66 The 
Court posited that the Michigan statute at issue was aimed at a 
"different type of corruption in the political arena: the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate 
form .... " 67 The Court held that, corporate wealth could unfairly 
influence elections when it is used in the form of independent 
expenditures, and as such, the State had a "sufficiently 
compelling rationale to support its restriction .... "
68 
Before Austin, the Supreme Court had never held that 
Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political 
speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.69 Thus, the 
Court's decision in Austin was at odds with the longstanding 
position that believing a particular group "too powerful" is not 
a basis upon which to deny or withhold First Amendment 
rights, even if that group is corporate or labor union in form. 
70 
Austin was a notable diversion from the Court's recognition 
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that First Amendment rights and protections extend to 
everyone, even corporations. 71 Shortly after Austin, Congress 
took advantage of the judicial support for banning corporate 
and union independent expenditures and enacted the McCain-
Feingold law ("BCRA"). 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and 
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
Immediately after the BCRA was enacted, it faced its 
first challenge in the courts in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission. 72 In McConnell, multiple plaintiffs asserted that 
section 203 of the BCRA was an unconstitutional restriction on 
free speech because the statute's prohibition of "electioneering 
communications" was applied to more than just express 
advocacy. 
73 
The Court rejected this argument and held that 
section 203 was facially constitutional because the rationale for 
regulating corporate independent expenditures that were 
express advocacy could also be applied to ads that are "the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy. " 74 The Court based 
its holding in McConnell on the presumption that these types of 
expenditures could have the same kind of "corrosive and 
distorting effect" on the electorate as the expenditures 
specifically prohibited under Austin, and extending that 
restriction would serve the government's compelling interest in 
countering those effects. 75 Even though the Supreme Court did 
not elaborate on the definition of "functional equivalent," they 
based their opinion on the district court 's determination that the 
BCRA targeted only broadcast ads because those ads are the 
most effective form of communicating an electioneering 
message and therefore posed the greatest risk of corruption. 76 
Even though the Court declared § 203 to be facially 
constitutional with regard to the McConnell ads, it opened the 
door to future "as-applied" challenges and remarked that such 
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challenges could be successful on a case-by-case basis. 77 The 
first successful as-applied challenge came four years later 
in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
Inc. 78 Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a non-profit 
corporation, wished to use its general treasury funds to pay for 
television advertisements on the issue of the US Senate 
filibuster of Bush administration judicial nominees. 79 The ads 
were to be broadcast during the period prohibited by the BCRA 
- the period immediately freceding the reelection of Wisconsin 
Senator Russ Feingold.8 WRTL admitted that some of the 
81 funds to be used for the ads had come from corporate donors. 
The Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion in 
WRTL. Rather, the Court splintered into three lines of 
reasoning. The opinion that is considered the lead opinion, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justice Alito, 
provided that the determination in McConnell - that section 
203 could constitutionally prohibit ads that were the 
"functional equivalent" of express advocacy - was still valid. 82 
However, Justice Roberts elaborated on that interpretation by 
stating that, "a court should find that an ad is the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of 
no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for 
or against a specific candidate. " 83 When this new test was 
applied to the ads to be broadcast by WRTL, the Court found 
that they were not the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy because they took a position on a legislative issue 
and urged the public to contact their representatives rather than 
. d .d 84 specifically advocating for or agamst a can 1 ate. 
Importantly, the ads didn ' t "mention an election, candidacy, 
political party, or challenger" or "[take] a position on a 
candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office." 85 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with the 
functional equivalency test utilized by Justice Roberts, but 
concurred with Roberts ' determination that section 203 was 
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unconstitutional as applied to WRTL's ads. 86 As a result of 
their concurrence, Justice Robert's test was identified as the 
holding in the case. 87 Shortly after the WRTL case was 
decided, the FEC federal regulations to codify 
Justice Roberts's rationale. 8 
As a result of the Court's holdings in Austin, 
McConnell, and WRTL, when the Court was asked to evaluate 
the validity of a statutory restriction on corporate speech in 
Citizens United, it was faced with two separate but conflicting 
lines of precedent: the pre-Austin line that repeatedly struck 
down restrictions on free speech based on the speaker's 
corporate identity and a post-Austin line that said it would be 
acceptable to limit the speech of corporations and unions in 
certain circumstances. Before looking at how the Court 
resolved this dilemma, it is important to review the specific 
sections of the McCain-Feingold statute that were at issue. 
THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REFORM LAW 
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act89 ("BCRA"), otherwise known as the McCain-
Feingold Act. The McCain-Feingold Act was one of the most 
far-reaching overhauls of campaign finance law since the 
1970's and in broad terms, it banned unlimited corporate 
donations to national political party committees, put limitations 
on advertising by organizations not affiliated with parties, and 
banned the use of corporate and union money for 
"electioneering communications" - ads that name a federal 
candidate - within 30 days of a primary election or 60 days of 
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a general election. 90 The sponsor of the bill, John McCain, 
stated that the BCRA, 
" . .. seeks to reform the way we finance 
campaigns for federal office in three major 
ways. First, BCRA prohibits the national 
political parties from raising or spending "soft 
money" (large contributions, often from 
corporations or labor unions, not permitted in 
federal elections), and it generally bans state 
parties from using soft money to finance federal 
election campaign activity. Second, it increases 
the hard money contribution limits set by the 
1974 amendments to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act ("FECA"). Finally, the new law 
prohibits corporations and unions from using 
soft money to finance broadcast campaign ads 
close to federal elections (though corporations 
and unions can finance these ads with hard 
money through their political action 
committees), and it requires individuals and 
unincorporated groups to disclose their spending 
on these ads. The law represents the most 
comprehensive congressional reform of our 
federal campaign finance system since FECA 
was enacted and amended in the 1970s." 91 
By passing the BCRA, Congress was hoping to stop the 
unregulated flow of soft money and return the world of 
campaign finance regulation to its pre-Watergate position 
where there were defined prohibitions and limits on 
contributions to political parties. 92 The BCRA was the end 
result of "a protracted six-year legislative and political 
struggle"; however, as President Bush was signing the bill into 
law, the first wave of more than a dozen lawsuits challenging 
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its constitutionality were already crashing upon the Supreme 
C , h 93 s· ourt s s ores. mce the BCRA's enactment, the Supreme 
Court has heard several cases addressing various campaign 
finance issues regulated therein, but none of these cases have 
been as controversial or had the impact on campaign finance 
law as Citizens United. 
The specific BCRA provisions at issue in Citizens 
United were sections 201 , 203 and 311 94, all of which served 
as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
("FECA"). 95 Section 203 of BCRA regulates using corporate 
funds for "electioneering communications. " 96 In general, an 
electioneering communication was identified as a "broadcast 
cable, or satellite" communications made within 60 days of 
general election or 30 days of a primary election. 97 Section 
203 continues by restricting corporations and labor unions from 
funding electioneering communications from their general 
funds except under certain specific circumstances such as get-
. 98 ' out-the-vote campatgns. Even though certain types of 
"electioneering communications" are permissible, they are 
subject to BCRA's disclosure and disclaimer requirements that 
are delineated under sections 201 and 311. 
Section 201 of BCRA contains a donor disclosure 
provision for electioneering communications. 99 Persons who 
disburse an aggregate of $10,000 or more a year for the 
production and airing of electioneering communications are 
required to file a statement with the Federal Election 
C . . ( 100 ommtsston FEC). The statement must include the names 
and addresses of persons who have contributed in excess of 
$1 ,000 to accounts funding the communication. 10 1 
BCRA's section 311 contains a disclaimer provision for 
electioneering communications. 102 If the candidate or the 
candidate's political committee did not authorize the 
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electioneering communication at issue, then the organization 
responsible for the communication must disclosure that 
organization "is responsible for the content of th1s 
d . . , 103 a vert1smg. 
CITIZENS UNITED & HILLARY: THE MOVIE 
Citizens United is a non-profit corporation with an 
annual budget of about $12 million. 104 The corporation 
acquires the majority of these funds via donations from 
individuals; however, it receives donations from for-profit 
1o5 8 c· · u · d corporations as well. In January 200 , tttzens mte 
released a 90-minute documentary examining the record, 
policies, and character of the then-Presidential Democrat 
primary candidate Hillary Clinton. 106 The documentary, 
Hillary: The Movie, examined "Hillary Clinton 's pohtlcal 
background in a critical light" 107, and mainly on 
aspects of Hillary's political career: (1) the finng of certam 
White House staff during her husband's presidency, (2) 
retaliation against a woman who accused her husband of sexual 
harassment, (3) violations of finance restrictions during her 
Senate campaign, (4) her husband's abuse of presidential 
pardon power, and (5) her record on various political 
issues." 108 The film was to be released in theaters and on 
DVD; however, Citizens United desired a broader distribution 
and arranged to have the movie broadcast on cable through 
"d d d 109 v1 eo-on- eman . 
Since the documentary was to be broadcast during 
Clinton's presidential primary campaign, Citizens Unite? was 
aware that its movie and advertising might be constdered 
electioneering communications and would be subject to 
110 . "k BCRA's sections 201, 203 and 3 l l. As a preempttve stn e, 
Citizens United sought an injunction to block the FEC from 
enforcing those sections on the grounds they violated the First 
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 111 To Citizens United's 
disappointment, the broadcast was banned when the Federal 
Elections Commission declared that the broadcast would 
violate various provisions of the BCRA. 112 Since the BCRA 's 
drafters anticipated the likelihood of lawsuits questioning its 
validity 113, it contains a provision that specifically addresses 
constitutional challenges to its various prohibitions. 114 This 
provision requires that these claims be brought before a three-
judge panel of the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia. 115 Appeals from this court go directly to the 
U 0 d s 116 mte tates Supreme Court. As a result of these 
jurisdictional restrictions, Citizens United went to the District 
Court for injunctive relief but its application was denied. 117 
Citizens United immediately appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Supreme Court Elects to Examine the BCRA on its Face 
When analyzing the numerous arguments presented in 
Citizens United, the Court determined that "in the exercise of 
judicial responsibility," it needed to examine the validity of the 
BCRA on its face, and not on the narrower grounds suggested 
by the litigants and the holdings of earlier decisions, because to 
do so would lead to further litigation and, in the interim, 
political speech would be chilled. 118 The Court rejected 
Citizens United's as-applied challenges based on the finding 
that the documentary Hillary The Movie was the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy because it was essentially a 
"feature-l_ength negative _advertisement that viewers to 
vote agamst Senator Clmton for President." 1 9 The Court 
further rejected the contention that it should create an as-
applied exception for documentary films because to do so 
would require it to redraw constitutional lines for different 
types of media, 120 which could have the unintended result of 
chilling political speech. 121 
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The Court correctly noted that if it applied the test 
established in Austin (the anti-distortion test), instead of 
examining the statute on its face, it could "produce the 
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence" of banning 
political speech emanating from media corporations. 122 While 
noting that media corporations were technically exempt from 
the corporate expenditure ban set forth in section 441 b 123, the 
Court observed that media corporations also accumulate 
immense wealth with the help of the corporate form and that 
"the views expressed by media corporations often ' have little 
I . h bl" ' , r th . , 124 or no corre at10n to t e pu IC s support 10r ose vtews. 
As the Court went on to observe, the " line between the media 
and others who wish to comment on political and social issues 
has become far more blurred" with the advent of the Internet, 
blogs, and cable television, and the decline of traditional print 
and broadcast media. 125 Within the context of this dilemma, 
the Court recognized that making distinctions between media 
corporations and non-media corporations would be difficult at 
best. 126 Analyzing the statute on case-by-case basis could have 
the unfortunate result of exempting a corporation that owns 
both media and non-media businesses, while simultaneously, a 
wholly non-media corporation could be forbidden to speak 
even though it may have the same interests. 127 Such a result 
cannot be squared with the First Amendment. 
Last, after the Court examined the morass of existing 
legislation, FEC advisory opm10ns, explanations and 
justifications, and FEC regulations governing the universe of 
campaign finance, it concluded that the existing complicated 
regulatory scheme acted as a prior restraint on speech in the 
harshest of terms. 128 As such, the Court determined that the 
proper adjudication required it to finally consider the 
facial validity of section 441 b of the BCRA, and whether 
courts should continue to adhere to Austin and the relevant 
portion of McConnell. 129 
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Justice Kennedy's First Amendment Analysis 
The First Amendment provides that, "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 130 It is 
undisputable that free speech is an "essential mechanism of 
democracy" because one of its many benefits is that it affords 
citizens the opportunity to hold their elected officials 
accountable. 131 As such, the "First Amendment 'has its fullest 
and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a 
campaign for political office." 132 The Supreme Court has 
already recognized that the "discussion of public issues and 
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the 
operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution."133 Thus, in this context, if the First Amendment 
is to mean anything, it must mean that the government is not 
permitted to fine or imprison citizens or associations of citizens 
merely for engaging in political speech. 134 
Recognizing the above to be true, it is a natural 
progression to hold that political speech must be protected 
from that are to. ei.ther suppress it, 
or do s.o madvertently. For 1t IS political speech, emanating 
from d1verse sources, that provides the voters with some of the 
information necessary to decide which candidates to support. 136 
Every first-year law student learns that laws that burden 
speech, even political speech, will be subject to "strict 
. " . b 137 scrutmy review y the Court. In order to successfully make 
it past this review the government will be required demonstrate 
that the law "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly 
tailored" to promote that interest. 138 In Citizens United the 
' Supreme Court recognized that on rare occasions it has upheld 
a "narrow class of speech restrictions" that do infringe on a 
speaker's First Amendment rights; however, in all these cases, 
the Court found a compelling governmental interest. 139 
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The Court did not find a compelling interest in Citizens 
United. 140 Justice Kennedy observed that the Court has a long 
history of holding that corporations are entitled to the rights 
recognized under the First Amendment. 141 These rights 
include political speech. 142 First Amendment protections do not 
vanish merely because the speaker is a corporation. As the 
Court correctly recognized, "speech restrictions based on the 
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to 
control content." 143 "The concept that the government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to 
enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the 
First Amendment." 144 Here, the Court recognized that the FEC 
set in place a complicated process whereby it, and it alone, 
would select what political speech is safe for dissemination to 
the public, and in so it employed a series of 
subjective and ambiguous tests. 14 Such a scheme would act as 
a prior restraint and an unprecedented governmental intrusion 
on the right to speak, the likes of which cannot be sustained. 146 
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to 
others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or 
class of the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, 
. fi h k ' . 147 "Th standmg, and respect or t e spea er s voice. e 
Government may not by these means deprive the public of the 
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and 
speakers are worthy of consideration." 148 Moreover, the Court 
recognized that upholding the statute and allowing the 
government to ban corporations from engaging in political 
speech could result in suppression of speech in other media 
such as books, 149 blogs, or social networking websites. 150 The 
government's interest in leveling the political influence playing 
field between individuals and corporations was unconvincing 
when one considers that a "mere 24 individuals contributed an 
astounding total of $142 million" during the 2008 election. 151 
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Simultaneously, other like-minded citizens who have organized 
under the corporate form were prohibited from having their 
voices heard. The Court rightly concluded that the First 
Amendment is part of the foundation for the freedom to 
exchange ideas, and the public must be able to use all kinds of 
forums to share those ideas without fear of governmental 
reprisal. 152 
WHAT DOES THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGAL 
LANDSCAPE LOOK LIKE POST -CITIZENS 
UNITED? 
As mentioned at the outset of this article, Citizens 
United caused an eruption of criticism about the holding 's 
impact on the world of campaign finance and the potential 
corruptive influence of corporations and unions on the political 
process. 153 Critics of the decision should take some comfort in 
the reality that Citizens United will likely have less of a 
negative impact, if at all, than originally feared. 
First, while some early supporters of the BCRA touted 
that its provisions barred corporations and unions from funding 
political ads 154, in reality, the BCRA merely required 
that corporations and unions finance the ads through their 
PACs or similar voluntarily financed segregated funds. 
155 PAC's were exempted under the BCRA, and even though 
they were complicated to create and manage, they did afford 
corporations a forum to participate in the political process. 156 
So, as long as corporations and unions collected campaign 
funds from their members with the member 's informed 
consent, these entities could continue to influence elections and 
some experts even expected the number of ads to increase after 
the passage of the BCRA. 157 Moreover, even though 
corporations and unions are no longer prohibited from 
engaging in independent expenditures in support of or against 
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political candidates, their participation in elections remains 
highly regulated. For example, direct contributions by 
corporations and unions are still prohibited under federal law 
and under the laws of 24 states. 158 A corporation or union still 
cannot donate corporate money directly to, or coordinate their 
political spending with, candidates for political office. 159 The 
laws requiring specific notices or disclaimers on political 
advertising remains untouched by Citizens United. 160 There is 
still a myriad of disclosure laws governing independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications on the part of 
. d . 16 1 Th "f t. corporatiOns an umons. us, even 1 a corpora IOn or 
union were to independently expend funds in support of a 
candidate, money that is donated to the corporation for the 
purpose of financing said expenditures would be subject to the 
disclosure laws. 162 And last, despite President Obama's 
declaration that foreign entities will now have greater influence 
on American elections, foreign corporations and their 
subsidiaries are still subject to the existing spending bans. 163 
What has not been widely discussed is that Citizens 
United has spawned a new wave of litigation concerning 
several other aspects of the BCRA. For example, two federal 
courts issued campaign finance law decisions in the spring of 
2010 that can trace their origins back to Citizens United. In 
SpeechNow.Org v. FEC164, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
was asked to weigh in on the constitutionality of the BCRA's 
contribution limitations and disclosure requirements as applied 
to contributions to a PAC. The court held that, since the 
expenditures themselves do not corrupt, it should follow that; 
contributions to groups that plan to make those expenditures 
will not lead to com1ption either. 165 But this unfettered right to 
donate to a group like SpeechNow does not extend to the right 
to donate to an actual political party. As such, "under current 
law, outside groups - unlike candidates and political parties -
may receive unlimited donations to both advocate in favor of 
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political candidates and to sponsor issue ads." 166 This 
particular dilemma was raised in the second case -Republican 
National Committee v. FEC. 167 In the Republican National 
Committee case, the RNC challenged the BCRA's soft-money 
ban claiming that it had the right to raise and spend unlimited 
amounts of money on all kinds of election-related issues 168 and 
that the ban discriminates against the national political 
parties. 169 The court held that plaintiffs' claims were at odds 
with the Supreme Court's holding in McConnell and that the 
Court's recent decision in Citizens United did not disturb the 
part of McConnell's holding that addressed the constitutionality 
ofBCRA's limits on contributions to political parties. 170 
There are also several new issues that have been raised 
as a result of the holding in Citizens United. When President 
Obama "dressed down" the Supreme Court in his State of the 
Union address in 2009, he, along with other critics 
conveniently failed to mention the ,group that benefitted the 
fi h d · · I b · 111 most rom t e ectswn - a or umons. Skeptics could argue 
that this is because nine out of ten dollars spent on elections by 
unions goes to the Democrats - Obama's party. 172 It is 
interesting that the majority of the criticism of Citizens United 
comes from the political left, and while they lament the 
decision's impact as it relates to corporations, those same 
critics often fail to mention the impact on union participation in 
the electoral process. Unions admittedly spent approximately 
one half billion dollars in the 2008 election, a figure that 
dwarfs the spending of corporations. 173 
In addition, while critics of the decision claim the 
majority "piously claim it's about free speech," 174 they have sat 
si lent, or in some cases applauded, as the Supreme Court relies 
on First Amendment jurisprudence in cases about Internet 
pornography 175, flag burning 176, topless dancing 177, cross-
b . 118 d h . urnmg , an even t e creatwn, sale, or possession of films 
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I 179 T depicting animal torture for purposes of sexual ar?usa . o 
hold that such conduct described in these cases ts worthy of 
constitutional protection, yet simultaneously support the idea 
that a corporation that expends its funds in support of a 
political candidate should be exposed to criminal liabi lity 
seems irreconcilable. Last, while political pundits and scholars 
have criticized the ability of corporations to use their vast 
wealth to allegedly influence elections, they rarely express the 
same concern for the sudden rise of wealthy individuals who 
are using their own millions to either buy an elected position 
for themselves or use it to influence the outcome of others.
180 
Recent political candidates like Mayor Michael Bloomberg in 
New York, California Gubernatorial candidates Arnold 
Schwarzenegger and Meg Whitman, New Jersey Governor 
John Corzine, the Kennedy and Bush families, Connecticut 
Senate candidate Linda McMahon and Florida Senate 
candidate Jeff Greene, and billionaires George Soros and 
Rupert Murdoch, just to name a few, have all their own 
immense financial resources in an effort to mfluence the 
electorate. 
While many cnttcs focus on corporations making 
sizable expenditures on behalf of a candidate, they lose 
of the reality that the public's participation in the pohttcal 
process has changed with the advent of th.e. For 
example, given the success of Internet fundratsmg m the 
presidential election, it is likely that in. future. electwns, 
aggregations of smaller individual donatwns will actually 
outweigh the spending of corporations. 181 In his 2008 
Presidential campaign, Barack Obama raised close to a half-a-
. h. . 182 Ofth billion dollars via Internet donatwns to ts campatgn. . e 
6.5 million donations received by Obama, 6 million were for 
$100 or less, with the average on-line donation being $80.
183 
According to the Federal Election Commission, the total. s.um 
of individual donations of $200 or less to all pollttcal 
---
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candidates in the 2008 election exceeded that of contributions 
from individual donors who gave more than $2,000. I84 In fact, 
to simplify and hopefully enhance this trend, some experts 
have suggested new ways for individual citizens to contribute 
. b f I85 to campaigns y way o a tax credit. The proposal provides 
that each American should be allowed a limited federal tax 
credit that could only be applied if the money is donated to a 
federal candidate during election years. I86 It is further posited 
that, if the tax credit could be collected electronically in the 
form of a credit card, debit card, or directly from a bank 
account, the simplicity would increase participation and could 
result in candidates paying more attention to mainstream 
issues.I87 
CONCLUSION: 
Citizens United, while controversial, marks the end of 
more than twenty years of erosion of the First Amendment 
rights of corporations and unions, particularly on the issue of 
political speech. As Justice Kennedy stated, one of the 
hallmarks of the First Amendment is that it should not be 
applied based on the identity of the speaker. Is8 The idea that a 
speaker who engages in the political process can be imprisoned 
for his or her conduct is the antithesis of what freedom of 
speech is all about and sadly brings to mind regrettably similar 
acts in our history such as the Alien and Sedition Acts. I89 As 
noted above, there is likely to be very little change in corporate 
political activities after Citizens United because corporations 
have been participating in the political process despite the 
existence of the BCRA. They just had to do so through their 
P ACs. After the dust settles, if Congress still believes that it is 
wrong to allow corporations and unions to use independent 
expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate for 
political office, they can certainly take appropriate action to 
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address the problem - so long as that action IS not 
unconstitutional. 
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